

To avoid any confusion over the importance of the majority quorum requirement, and to ensure strict compliance and enforcement, I am today introducing an amendment to House Rules to require that the committee report on any measure reported by a committee either include a list of those Members voting for and against the measure, including those voting by proxy; or, in the case of a nonrecord vote, the names of those members actually present at the time the measure is ordered reported.

Obviously, a bill could not be considered unless the report contained this information. And the lists of members actually present as contained in the report would serve as the evidence of compliance with the rule should a point of order be raised that a quorum was not present. In this way we can avoid the questionable practice of relying on the word of a bill's manager in those instances in which the committee transcript does not clearly show the names of those present at the time of reporting.

While this may seem a niggling rule to some, I would submit that it is essential to our legislative process that a majority of a committee's members actually participate in reporting legislation to this House. To the extent that bills do not reflect the will of an informed and participating majority at the committee level, the more the measure is likely to be unacceptable to and rewritten by the House membership when it reaches the floor.

I urge my colleagues to cosponsor this resolution. At this point in the RECORD I include the text of my proposed rule change:

H. RES.—

Resolved. Rule XI of the rules of the House of Representatives is amended in the following ways:

Clause 2(1)(2)(B) is amended to read as follows:

“(B) With respect to each rollcall vote on a motion to report any bill or resolution of a public character, the total number of votes cast for, and the total number of votes cast against, the reporting of such bill or resolution, together with the names of those members voting for, and those members voting against, reporting the resolution (including a designation of those members voting by proxy), shall be included in the committee report.”

Clause 2(1)(2) is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

“(C) With respect to any nonrecord vote on a motion to report any bill or resolution of a public character, the names of those members of the committee actually present at the time the bill or resolution is ordered reported shall be included in the committee report.”

TIME TO TIGHTEN SANCTIONS

HON. WILLIAM (BILL) CLAY

OF MISSOURI

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, October 28, 1987

Mr. CLAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been 1 year since Congress enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over the veto of President Reagan. The Anti-Apartheid legislation was our Nation's first real effort to address the abominable human rights violations occurring in South Africa. The Reagan administration's failure to advance an effective United States policy toward South Africa requires that Congress renew our efforts. As we in this body

continue to assess the situation in South Africa and to promote an effective anti-apartheid policy, I commend the following editorial which appeared in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 8, 1987:

TIME TO TIGHTEN SANCTIONS

President Reagan has followed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 the way a mischievous child obeys his mother: selectively. The law, passed over a veto, required Mr. Reagan to report on the impact of economic sanctions against South Africa. In complying, he noted that no lessening of apartheid can be seen. That being the case, the law then requires additional punitive measures. Mr. Reagan declines.

He acknowledges that the state of emergency has been reimposed along with other draconian repression of blacks and that the Botha government has failed to meet with black leaders. But the administration blames the sanctions, saying their "impact has been more negative than positive."

The initial sanctions, however, were intended as a message that the United States was willing to back up economically its advocacy of an end to apartheid. Should that word be disbelieved or unheeded, as is the case, the plan was to increase the sanctions. Such incremental tightening of an economic vise was designed to push toward peaceful change while leaving some time for the United States to lend whatever auspices might bring about a new order, including all races, in South Africa.

In short, one year's sanctions were not expected to end apartheid abruptly. The president's recalcitrance on increasing sanctions is matched by the undercutting that has occurred this year. Randall Robinson, head of the anti-apartheid group, TransAfrica, points to several administration deficiencies: The act provided for convening a conference of industrial nations to try to reach an agreement on sanctions—no attempt was made to call such a conference. South African uranium was to be banned—a loophole was created administratively. The same thing happened with barring iron, steel and iron ore.

Economic sanctions pose difficult moral questions for countries imposing them because strict bans will mean hardship for the very people they are designed to help. Writing in *The New York Times*, longtime apartheid foe and member of the South African Parliament, Helen Suzman, notes that the response to U.S. and European sanctions was a surge of support for ultra-conservatives. Says Mrs. Suzman, "If there were any chance that sanctions would dismantle apartheid, I would be the first to support them. But reducing South Africa to a wasteland would lead not to a nonracial democracy but to more oppression and misery. No one should be under the delusion that things are so bad in South Africa that they could not get worse."

But what is the alternative? Diplomacy and pleading can only go so far; at some point a country must stand firmly against a system of government that allocates basic rights by the color of citizens' skin. Phased-in sanctions, at least, keep the dialogue going in the hope that a wasteland—or worse, the devastation of civil war—can be averted. Congress must, again, direct the president to take a firm stand against apartheid. It should close the loopholes the administration opened this past year and increase restrictions so there can be no doubt of U.S. resolve to oppose apartheid.

BEYOND SANCTIONS

HON. PHILIP M. CRANE

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, October 28, 1987

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Speaker, under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, the President is required annually to review the sanctions placed upon South Africa by the United States. After recently reviewing the act, President Reagan concluded that the United States should not implement additional sanctions. This conclusion comes in light of the fact that current sanctions have not led to an improvement in conditions for black South Africans. It may be further argued that sanctions have not only failed to promote improvements, but have, in fact, led to increased hardships for black South Africans.

The tragedy of sanctions is that they undercut one of the most effective weapons blacks in South Africa have against apartheid: their growing economic power. In fact, as former Assistant U.S. Secretary of State Alan Keyes points out, blacks have achieved their greatest victories over apartheid in the economy. The recent mining strike and the pass-law repeal demonstrate the growing economic leverage blacks have. Sanctions, however, threaten to halt this progress.

Secretary of State George Shultz recently praised the accomplishments of black schools, unions, and entrepreneurs in undermining apartheid and convincing whites that blacks can prosper if given the necessary freedom. The United States should go further and redirect foreign aid to help blacks push for nonviolent change. However, blacks can exert such power only if the South African economy grows. This necessary economic growth is possible only if the United States realizes that sanctions are indeed a failure. Rather than working to increase the severity of sanctions against South Africa, the United States should correct its previous mistake by repealing the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986.

I would like to submit the following article enumerating the inconsistencies of sanctions for the careful consideration of my colleagues.

WHY SANCTIONS ARE A FAILURE

(By Simon Jenkins)

As soon as America's General Motors Corporation bowed to sanctions pressure and pulled out of South Africa, its local management moved fast. Renamed Delta Motors, the auto company removed 500 workers, dropped off the "Sullivan list" of firms enforcing intergrationist work practices and reversed the policy of not selling to the apartheid regime. GM thus joined some 80 American firms that have left South Africa in the past 18 months. As Congress begins a review of sanctions legislation, the results are hardly contributing to the anti-apartheid cause.

South Africa, in fact, is changing from being a classic case for economic sanctions to a classic case against them. As a tool of foreign policy, sanctions always have been easier to advocate than to impose, let alone succeed.

Succinctly put, sanctions are one of the most ineffective forms of aggression, vulnerable on at least four fronts:

The free-trade market has ways of finding new sources of supply or new conduits for