

len and the Valley, you would have the opportunity to see one of the many international bridges in the area and view the pulse of traffic and commerce that is a feature of our daily life down in this part of the U.S.

Life in this border region is similar to the life of twins—one knows what the other is sensing and what the other needs. We need to continue efforts at building a legal and regulatory framework that allows for the development of more cooperation, more understanding, and increased mutual projects and efforts.

Thank you again, Madam Chairman and Commissioners, for giving me this opportunity to voice my belief in perpetual U.S. and Mexican friendship.

STAN EVANS LOOKS ASKANCE AT SALT II DECISION

HON. JIM COURTER

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 8, 1986

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Speaker, the recent Presidential decision to extend U.S. compliance with the unratified and expired SALT II Treaty is emblematic of the many national security and foreign policy cross-currents that pull the Reagan administration in opposite directions. As the following article by M. Stanton Evans in Human Events illustrates, it is difficult to fathom what motivates the President "to take a hard line toward the lesser terrorist in Tripoli while seeking accommodation with the greater one in Moscow."

The answer, of course, is that various factions in the administration's national security apparatus jockey for ascendancy on each pressing issue, alternately standing firm or making strategic concessions, as each situation warrants. Unfortunately, the appearance is that of a Reagan administration "deeply divided against itself. The net result is incoherence—which cannot lead, and which no one can follow." I urge my colleagues to consider the full text of Stan Evans' thought-provoking piece.

The article follows:

[From Human Events, May 3, 1986]

SALT II DECISION SIGNALS INCOHERENCE

(By M. Stanton Evans)

Just when it seems the Reagan Administration has got its act together and charted a sensible course in defense and foreign policy, it invariably reverses itself once more and heads off in the opposite direction.

The latest case of apparent resolve diffused into a blur of indecision is the tough line staked out by Mr. Reagan in striking back at Libya's Qaddafi. Whatever else might be said about this episode, it was a clear example of decisive leadership in action. And, despite the protests of the Third World and the Europeans, there is evidence that this leadership has had beneficial impact on the alliance we are supposed to head.

Comes now, however, the inevitable reversal—a determination by the Reagan planners to continue abiding by the unratified SALT II agreement. The reason for this is to go yet another "extra mile" in trying to persuade the Soviets of our *bona fides* in the realm of arms control. The ironies involved in this endeavor—and the negative signals imparted in terms of leadership—are almost too numerous to mention. Among the more obvious:

Continued attempts to seek detente with Moscow go directly contrary to the tough line on Qaddafi. The Soviets and the East bloc generally are his foremost backers. Libya is stuffed with Soviet weapons and advisors. The head of its secret police is an East German. The Soviets are also behind such terrorist as Syria, Cuba, Nicaragua and the African National Congress, shot down an unarmed passenger liner, are savaging Afghanistan, etc. What sense does it make to take a hard line toward the lesser terrorist in Tripoli while seeking accommodation with the greater one in Moscow?

Quite apart from the terrorism question, the SALT decision is irrational on the face of it. The treaty was rejected by the U.S. Senate in 1979 and has never been ratified. If it had been ratified, it would have by now expired. President Reagan said in 1980 that it was "fatally flawed," and shouldn't be adopted. His Administration now says the Soviets are violating it, along with numerous other arms accords. Why, in view of all of this, should we abide by it?

In the matter of Soviet violations, the Reagan regime has recently issued a report detailing the numerous transgressions of the Soviets and asserting that "for one side (the United States) to adhere and for the other side (the Soviet Union) not to adhere does not constitute real arms control at all. Rather, it constitutes a dangerous form of bilateral disarmament in the guise of bilateral arms control." Exactly so. But if the Reagan Administration keeps adhering to SALT II despite the Soviets' violations, what incentive do they have to change?

The Administration has talked at length about the need to refurbish our defenses, and about the shortage of necessary funds to get the job done. Yet in order to abide by the SALT II limits, we have already dismantled one Poseidon submarine and are now scheduled to dismantle two more. These subs cost hundreds of millions of dollars to build, and still more millions to destroy. If our defenses are really in such disrepair, can we afford to be dismantling perfectly usable weapons in this fashion?

Reagan spokesmen and numerous people in Congress have lamented the vulnerability of our land-based missiles, leading to endless wrangles over the MX-Peacekeeper program and a "basing mode" that would protect it from Soviet first strike. It is generally agreed that our submarine-borne missiles are more "survivable" than our land-based ones, since they are harder to find. Why should we be taking such missiles out of service even as we bewail the growing problem of vulnerability?

The centerpiece of the Reagan doctrine in matters pertaining to nuclear deterrence is the Strategic Defense Initiative, which would protect us from a Soviet missile attack and repudiate the folly of "mutual assured destruction." But if SDI is ever to become reality, the United States will have to get out of the ABM treaty of 1972, which forbids the deployment of missile defenses. Our unwillingness to abandon SALT II, which has never been ratified, makes it most unlikely that we would have the fortitude to break out of an accord that is still extant and binding.

There are more such paradoxes that could be cited, but none of these, as important as they are, is as significant as the central message of SALT II adherence by this Administration. The Reagan regime, in terms of policy and personnel, is deeply divided against itself. The net result is incoherence—which cannot lead, and which no one can follow.

NEW YORK LAW PROHIBITS CONTRACTS WITH FIRMS EN- FORCING APARTHEID

HON. MAJOR R. OWENS

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 8, 1986

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Speaker, New York City is having a problem with the U.S. Department of Transportation. The Department of Transportation insists that Federal highway funds be conserved by awarding contracts to the lowest responsible bidder. New York City, however, insists upon applying local law 19 which prohibits contracts between New York City and firms which supply South African agencies which enforce apartheid and firms which use products from South Africa.

The Department of Transportation, in an April 22, 1986, letter signed by Jim J. Marquez, general counsel, counters that this is merely a problem of preemption when there is a conflict between local and Federal law. The letter notes,

Indeed, as a matter of the policy of this administration, President Reagan has issued two Executive orders to limit dealings with South Africa, saying that apartheid "is wrong and we condemn it."

However, when we are discussing the bottom line, the administration's policy is to preach virtue and practice sin.

This body must come to grips with the difficult problems which flow from a condemnation of apartheid. I have not heard any of our colleagues get up on this floor and proclaim the virtues of apartheid. There is universal disgust with this appalling system. Yet, one finds hesitation when it comes down to deciding on what actions can be taken. Apartheid is an evil force. It must end. Its supporters do not merit any support from the American Government, State and local government, or our private sector. There may be costs to this position—we may be asked to put some money on the line. However, that is little compared to what the oppressed majority in South Africa is being asked to bear. No one is coming after us with guns, tear gas, or metal whips. We are not being summarily arrested and subjected to the most horrendous physical and mental abuse. We are not being asked to bleed. We are being asked to accept minimal financial costs to support the fight against the evil of apartheid.

The administration may take any position that it wishes. It can condemn apartheid in any forum that it chooses, including through Executive orders. However, condemnation, stinging though it may be, is simply a series of words strung together which may not be worth the breath taken to utter them or the paper to write them down. Apartheid is a monumental evil which can only be defeated by the concerted efforts of men and women of good will who as individuals and whole societies take the necessary action to cut off its lifeblood.

New York City has taken a stand similar to that of other localities and States. That stand incurs costs. New York accepts those costs even though they bring a certain amount of pain. Why, if this administration is opposed to apartheid does it resist putting its money where its mouth is and begin to accept the costs of standing up for principle? Talk is

