

and I can safely say that the overwhelming reaction at each meeting was one of concern and fear.

I voted in favor of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act because I feel strongly that the continued storage of nuclear waste materials in temporary facilities at nuclear powerplants across the Nation is the worst possible answer to the waste disposal problem. Before supporting this act, however, I insisted that the Governor of a chosen State have veto power over the final site selection. And as you know, this veto can only be overridden by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

At the present time, we are at a stage where the Department of Energy has identified approximately 200 rock bodies for further consideration and final guidelines for the screening of these sites has just been announced. This screening process, as outlined by the 1982 act, considers various environmental, geological, and socioeconomic parameters to determine the suitability of an area as a potential waste site. Reviewing these guidelines has revealed not only deficiencies in the screening process but also basic inadequacies in the original law.

It is clear that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act did not place enough emphasis on the importance of considering the adequacy of regional and local transportation systems, and the potential transboundary impacts of a waste site in the population centers and hydrogeological resources of our foreign neighbors. In interpreting the act's requirements regarding population centers, DOE's screening guidelines creates a bias against the unique rural population centers that are prevalent in Vermont and throughout New England.

Mr. Speaker, I think you would agree that the immense task of finding a safe, suitable location for a high-level nuclear waste facility is equalled only by devising a safe and effective means of transporting this waste to the repository. With this in mind, I feel it is imperative that the condition of a region's transportation routes be fully assessed and considered a potential disqualifying factor if found to be inadequate. This survey must include an assessment of the status of these routes under varying climatic conditions.

In assigning various factors that would disqualify a location as a waste site, the 1982 act did not include any reference to the potential impacts of a site on the physical and biological environment of our foreign neighbors. This is an unfortunate oversight. As we all know, environmental and geological features know no political boundaries. This point was voiced by numerous Canadian citizens and officials attending the informational meetings held in Vermont.

The act did identify proximity to highly populated areas as a factor that would disqualify an area for further consideration as a potential waste site. The guidelines established by the Department of Energy regarding population, unfortunately, are not sensitive to the distribution of population in a rural area like Vermont. The Department has decided that municipalities of 2,500 or more that meet the Bureau of Census definition of "incorporated place" will be con-

sidered a highly populated area. This census classification excludes the incorporated towns of Vermont.

The result of DOE's decision to use this classification is to ignore 34 Vermont municipalities with populations of 2,500 or more. Unless the problem with the definition of a highly populated area is corrected, these Vermont municipalities will be treated on a different basis than comparable municipalities in other States in the crystalline rock study area. The safety of those living in these uncounted populated areas requires that the guidelines be adjusted to include their consideration.

It would be inappropriate to locate a waste site in Vermont due to the fractured, water-saturated nature of our granite formations, the proximity of these rock regions to our rural community centers, and our relative location, geologically and along surface water routes, to major United States and Canadian population centers. I am confident that the screening process established by the DOE will bear out these obvious flaws and limitations in a Vermont site.

However to ensure that all sites in the crystalline rock study area are fully assessed on their limitations and merits, the legislation I am introducing today will refine the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to include a better assessment of the adequacy of a region's transportation routes, a more equitable consideration of rural population centers and an assessment of the impacts of a repository on Canadian population centers and hydrogeologic resources. This is indeed a very hazardous and dangerous undertaking and we must proceed with the utmost caution.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to give this initiative their full consideration and support.

PUBLIC SENTIMENT IN WHITE SOUTH AFRICA

HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 11, 1985

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise to bring to my colleagues' attention a little known element in the antiapartheid equation. This element is the widespread desire among South Africa's whites for sweeping change in that country's racial policies.

President Botha has indicated that he has been forced into a balancing act between those who want an immediate end to apartheid, and those who would fight to the bitter end. If one is to accept Botha's argument, one would believe that he has been exceedingly flexible in turning South Africa away from racial separation. The problem is, of course, that Botha's supposed middle course is nothing more than maintenance of the status quo.

Most white South Africans now favor the dismantling of racial separation as the fundamental tenet of apartheid. They have not taken the next step of favoring universal franchise, but they are certainly not in step with Botha's hardline policies. Our colleague STEPHEN SOLARZ has written an ex-

cellent article on this subject. I would like to submit it for inclusion in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and urge my colleagues to give it close scrutiny.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 8, 1985]

TACKLING APARTHEID FROM THE INSIDE

(By Stephen J. Solarz)

WASHINGTON.—Defenders of the status quo in South Africa have resorted to the convenient fiction that the unyielding resistance of the white electorate prevents Pretoria from abolishing apartheid. In fact, the Government actually trails white opinion rather than being constrained by it. Public opinion polls indicate that roughly 70 percent of English-speaking whites and 40 percent of Afrikaners—or a slight majority of the white population—would support a unified South Africa with a universal franchise and a multiracial parliament. They would also back the elimination of such essential elements of apartheid as pass laws and influx controls, which separate blacks from their families.

This significant shift in white opinion can be traced in part to the movement of many Afrikaners from the country to the city. This has created a new class of businessmen and technocrats, who are more sophisticated and more skeptical of the illusions and sophistries of apartheid. The secret organization of Afrikaners known as the Broederhood, which has long been a bulwark of apartheid, now favors genuine power-sharing with blacks. And leading Afrikaner businessmen have joined their English-speaking counterparts in calling for fundamental political, social and economic changes.

To be sure, most South African whites would reject a unitary state based on the principle of one-man, one-vote, in which 51 percent of the voters could work their untrammelled will. But they might well accept a system of checks and balances based on a combination of majority rule and minority rights, with Federal arrangements providing for a devolution of power to regional and local authorities. While such a formula clearly falls short of maximum black aspirations, it would probably be an acceptable starting point for a long overdue dialogue between the races.

A move by the Government to enter into negotiations for power-sharing with blacks would undoubtedly trigger a backlash from hardline Afrikaners, leading to a fundamental political realignment among whites. The resulting fragmentation of the National Party's Afrikaner base might well deprive it of an absolute majority in Parliament. But it could still remain in power by forming a governing coalition—committed to ending apartheid—with the main opposition party, the Progressive Federal Party.

Unfortunately, such an act of surpassing statesmanship seems beyond the ability—or even the imagination—of President P.W. Botha. The Government is unwilling to further divide the Afrikaner community and risk relying on English-speaking whites for its parliamentary majority. Most importantly, the Government fears that sharing power with blacks would be the first step on a slippery slope toward the political chaos and economic disintegration that have overcome other African countries.

But whites in South Africa have a highly selective vision of the rest of Africa. They focus on Uganda under Idi Amin but forget about the Ivory Coast under Félix Houphouët-Boigny. They recall civil war in Nigeria but not social stability in Kenya. They remember interethnic tribal conflicts in Burundi but overlook political pluralism in Botswana.

