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CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS STATEMENT

TO

SECRETARY HENRY A. KISSINGER

AUGUST 19, 1975

## Preface

As Black Americans, we have a special interest in our government's policy toward Africa and we firmly believe that in this period of global interdependence, the current policy toward Africa works against American national interests.

There has been a reservoir of goodwill toward the United States on the African continent growing out of America's historical position as the first new nation, the presence here of the largest aggregation of persons of African descent outside African borders and the absence of an American Colonial past in Africa. Nevertheless, this Administration's policy toward the African nations prevents us from capitalizing fully on what has been this positive inclination toward the United States.

The three broad areas of policy which compromise U.S. interests in Africa are: (1) its lack of responsiveness to legitimate economic development concerns of African and other developing states; (2) its support of minority rule in Southern Africa, public pronouncements not withstanding and; (3) its general tendency to disregard Africa as expressed in omitting appropriate reference to it in major presidential foreign policy statements and its occasional cavalier treatment of African leaders.

We suggest that it is not in America's interest to pursue policies designed for a world that no longer exists. The expansion and the changing nature of the international community has multiplied the centers of power in a formerly bipolar world. African nations, located on a continent which has vast resources and is strategically located squarely in the middle of the major sea arteries critical to East-West trade -- the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the Mediterranean, and Red Sea -- can play an important role in the international community. However, through years of intransigence on economic and African colonial questions, the U.S. has lost the sympathetic support it enjoyed from most African countries in the early sixties. At a time when America is facing mounting criticism in several areas of the world, it can ill afford to foreclose indefinitely the goodwill of the African states.

Paradoxically, it is the former colonial powers, Britain, France, and most recently Portugal, that have been the first to reach some economic and political accommodation with Africa in response to the changes in the world power configuration. Through the Lome Agreement signed with the 46 African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries (ACP) the nine members of the European Economic Community have taken a major step to respond to the economic arrangements advocated by the developing countries. By proposing a general agreement on commodities at the recent Commonwealth meeting in Jamaica, Prime Minister Wilson reflected a further tilt in this direction.

Our principal allies have every given indication of forward movement in the southern African Policy. Britain, for whatever reason, abrogated the Simonstown Agreement with South Africa, and France has announced an important modification of its arms policy with the Pretoria government. However, even after Portugal recognized that independence in Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola was inevitable, the U.S. was the only country to veto Guinea Bissau's admission to the

World Health Organization (WHO). Such action gains nothing, but rather incurs the opprobrium of the African states.

Time and justice clearly are on the side of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. The independence of the formerly Portuguese administered territories removes South Africa's buffer zone and hastens this process.

There are important areas of policy where African and American interests coincide. Nigeria's willingness to sell oil to the U.S. during the OPEC oil boycott in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War proved immensely helpful to this country. Most recently at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting in Kampala, the African states blocked a resolution advocating Israel's expulsion from the United Nations. Such events point out the critical role African states can play on issues of importance to the United States.

Over and above these political interests, there are strong economic reasons for the U.S. to improve its relations with Africa.

(1) Two-way trade between Africa and the United States almost tripled between 1960 and 1970 mounting to \$4.3 billion in 1973. In 1973, U.S. exports to Africa rose by 46 percent.

(2) U. S. is becoming increasingly dependent on Africa's raw materials. Africa has all of the world's 53 most important minerals including 96 percent of the world's diamonds, 60 percent of the gold, 42 percent of the cobalt, 34 percent of the bauxite, 17 percent of the copper. In addition, 54 percent of U.S. manganese requirements come from Africa and 22 percent of its graphite are imported from the Malagasy Republic.

(3) Africa's energy resources are among the most plentiful in the world. While the full extent of Africa's petroleum and natural gas resources have yet to be assessed, Nigeria is the 7th largest producer of crude oil and 2nd largest supplier to the United States. In addition, Algeria, Angola and Gabon have substantial oil and gas resources. Africa holds 23 percent of the "free world" uranium resources, 16 percent of the world's water resources (more than any other continent) and untold geothermal power capability.

(4) The potential for investment and development in majority ruled African states remains largely untapped. U.S. investment in Nigeria alone is \$1 billion which is 50 percent of all U.S. investment in black Africa.

This brief summary of the potential and need for better relations with Africa leads us into a series of policy recommendations that might accomplish this end.

## Africa and the UN Special Session

The issues of the UN Special Session are particularly important for the African continent. Fully 16 of the 25 least developed and 21 of the 33 most seriously affected (MSA) are in Africa. Effective ways must be found to provide resources through trade, official development assistance and private investment that will enable African countries to develop their economies and to accord African and other developing countries an appropriate voice in the shaping of the new International Economic order.

1. The U. S. should take concrete steps to institute arrangements that will stabilize prices at reasonable levels for primary commodities.

During the sixties Africans sought agreements that would provide some security of the demand for their commodities. In the seventies recognition of the scarcity and the finite nature of natural resources has generated concern in the West about the security of supply of critical resources. OPEC's demonstrated ability after October 1973 to alter the price and supply of oil with relative impunity prompted the U. S., as have the developing countries, to seek effective remedies against fluctuating rises in critical commodities, i.e., the stabilization of prices through an agreement between producers and consumers and the creation of a facility to assist countries facing balance of payment deficits as a result of high oil prices. In effect the \$25 billion International Energy Agency fund, spurred by the U. S., serves as buffer stock for the oil consuming member nations. Nevertheless, the U. S. has consistently rejected developing country recommendations for a buffer stock mechanism for their primary commodities.

2. The U. S. should provide more Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) on better terms to African countries and continue to urge the OPEC countries and multilateral lending agencies to increase the transfer of revenues to these states.

Allowing the U.S. contribution to ODA to fall to only 0.25 percent of the gross national product (GNP) flies in the face of the humanitarianism and generosity that have been a proud tradition of this country. While we recognize that Africa receives a higher share of resource transfers in the form of grants than any other region, closer analysis reveals that Africa is allocated fewer resources on a per capita basis.

Although Africa contains the largest number of least developed and most seriously affected countries of any other region, this administration's FY 1976 Agency for International Development budget submitted to Congress requested less for Africa than any other region as indicated in the table below. Despite the residual effects of the Sahelian drought and the aggravation of the drought in Ethiopia and Somalia, less PL 480 assistance was requested for all of Africa than for Pakistan which has 1/4 Africa's population. More questionably almost as much, \$59,786,000 has been requested for Chile as for the entire African continent.

SUMMARY OF FISCAL 1976 AID REQUEST TO CONGRESS BY REGION  
(in thousands of dollars)

Region	Total Economic Assistance	A.I.D.	Peace Corps	PL 480	International Narcotics Control
Africa	256,415	169,700	24,665	63,850	--
East Asia and Pacific	362,016	124,140	8,501	206,801	17,425
Latin America	394,947	258,200	15,953	111,944	8,848
Near East and South Asia	722,414	273,186	7,782	438,074	3,372

Source: AID Fiscal 1976 Submission to the Congress, Summary, May 1975, pp. 10-16.

We applaud the recently reported upturn in total Development Assistance Committee (DAC) resource transfers to developing countries in 1975. We do understand, however, that the impact of the second dollar devaluation in 1973 and inflation may wipe out any real gain from this increase in magnitude.

While recognizing the U.S. current economic problems, there are a number of options available:

-- make more "program" aid available while understanding that balance of payments concerns may preclude any major changes in procurement tying. Program aid does provide greater flexibility to African countries affected by wide fluctuations in revenue;

-- support a contribution to the Development Fund of the African Development Bank;

-- initiate legislation that would relax the provision for MSA and least developed countries; that 50 percent of all products for AID funded projects be shipped in American vessels;

-- support international efforts to make more concessional aid available to the MSA countries;

-- end opposition to linking special drawing rights (SDR's) to development assistance. Under the present terms, SDR allocations, which amount to a specific series of untied grant equivalents at interest rates of 1-1/2 percent, do not carry the repugnant aid relationship and carry an automaticity factor that is desirable to developing countries. A more equitable distribution that would give developing countries more than the present 25 percent allocation of SDRs available should also be instituted.

3. The U.S. should end its negativism over debt rescheduling and consider debt cancellation for the least developed and most seriously affected African Countries as a form of aid.

On 35 occasions the administration has rescheduled debt payments for 13 countries. Moreover, since about 1/3 of the debt reflects private debt from export credits, the administration should investigate the feasibility of subsidizing export credits so that they can be made available on more favorable terms.

4. The U. S. should increase its food and aid assistance for agricultural production in Africa and take the lead in calling for a comprehensive development scheme for those areas of Africa devastated by the drought.

Food assistance available to Africa through the Food for Peace Program (PL 480) has declined because of the depletion of surplus commodities and the increase in commercial demand at a time when the drought has increased African need for such assistance.

U.S. agricultural policy has worked against the maintenance of a positive international food assistance program. Beginning in 1972 the government began to liquidate surplus commodities. Selling 27 million tons of grain to the Soviet Union further depleted U.S. food supplies and also drove up the price of grain. In 1973, during the height of the drought in the West African Sahel, the administration paid \$2 billion to keep 19.5 million acres of agricultural land out of production. As a result of these policy decisions, U.S. grain stocks declined from 68,516,000 metric tons in 1972-73 to 18,472,000 in 1975. Moreover, current U.S. agricultural policy which emphasizes market forces and land set asides precludes rebuilding large surplus stocks that served as a hedge against disaster until 1972. Nevertheless, the government recently authorized the sale of 9.8 million metric tons of grain to the Soviet Union and has negotiated a major grain deal with Japan.

We urge the government to:

-- initiate forward planning of food aid and fully accept the notion that international food assistance should not be dependent upon the availability of surplus commodities.

-- take the lead in setting up an international consortium to finance a comprehensive long-term development plan in the drought affected African countries. As

a result of the positive U.S. response to emergency and short and medium-term assistance in the Sahel and Ethiopia, this country has developed some expertise on the problems of these areas.

-- strengthen the mandate to supply U.S. Food For Peace, PL 480, on a priority basis to poor countries which need food aid most and respect the 30 percent limitation of PL480 food for political purposes embodied in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.

-- maintain a significant contribution to the target of 10 million tons of food assistance annually as recommended by the World Food Conference Resolution XVIII.

-- use food assistance programs in Africa and other developing countries as incentives for these countries to increase their agricultural production through mechanisms such as those embodied in the House International Relations, International Development and Food Assistance bill (H.R. 9005).

-- increase assistance for industrialization in Africa involving the transfer of technology recognizing that agricultural growth represents only one sector of a balanced developed economy.

5. The U.S. should support efforts by African and other developing countries to obtain a greater share in decision-making at the highest level in the U.N. and other major international organizations.

#### Political Aspects of U.S. - African Policy

The granting of independence to Mozambique and Angola has profound implications for the future course of events in southern Africa. This development calls for a reassessment of current U.S. policy south of the Zambezi, which is based on thinking outlined in National Security Council Study Memorandum of 1969 (NSSM 39).

Increasingly, the U.S. finds itself alone among western powers in not taking any forward steps to improve its policy in southern Africa. If the administration cannot take concrete measures to bring about majority rule in South Africa, it should at least refrain from supporting minority rule. There are several areas

where positive steps in this direction can be taken.

The twenty most important agricultural and mineral commodities accounted for approximately 80 percent of African trade in 1973 and 1974. Although prices for these commodities rose in 1972 and increased by 46 percent in 1973, this commodity price boom began to bottom out in the second quarter of 1974. As a result, excluding the 6 African oil producing countries, African commodity producers experienced in 1974 a deterioration in their terms of trade whereby the rise in the price for their exports was 23 percent below the cost of their imports. This stagnation continued in 1975.

A number of remedies have been suggested to stabilize commodity prices. The U.S. should stop defending the free market system for commodities which because of speculation, agreements and other factors does not exist for many commodities.

Specifically, we urge support for:

-- an integrated producer/consumer commodity scheme as an alternative to the proliferation of single commodity producer or consumer associations.

-- a buffer stock mechanism to be administered by the International Monetary Fund, in contrast to a system of indexation. Africans are more concerned about loss of revenue than an insurance against the price of inflation.

-- the reduction of non-tariff barriers during the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) that restrict imports of African and other developing countries, particularly those that discourage the processing of raw materials from developing prior to exportation.

-- support for legislative efforts that will exempt Nigeria and Gabon from Title V provisions in the Trade Act of 1974 preventing OPEC states from taking advantage of generalized trade preferences.

#### South Africa

6. The relaxation of the arms embargo to South Africa that now permits certain aircraft sales to the South African military should be ended. In addition, the embargo should include all sales to or for the South African military includ-

ing the provision of spare parts, components, and repairs. The Department of State said in February 1974 that:

The value of defense articles and services provided commercially to the South African Government during calendar year 1973 totalled \$802,608,000, composed entirely of spare parts and maintenance equipment for the seven C-130's purchased commercially by South Africa before the 1963 arms embargo ... the total value of sales and services to South Africa in connection with the seven C-130's from the imposition of the arms embargo through 1973 amounts to \$29,063,397.

7. The role of US military attaches in South Africa should be reviewed and cause shown as to why these functions should not be terminated. Moreover, there is mounting concern about the state of "unofficial" visits to the U.S. by high level South African defense and other government officials, i.e., the January 1974 visit of Dr. Cornelius Mulder during which he met with Vice Admiral Ray Peet, the May 1974 visit of Admiral Hugo Bierman, Chief of South Africa's Defense Forces and his meetings with Acting Under Secretary of the Navy Middendorff and with Admiral Thomas Moorer, then chairman of our Joint Chief of Staff.

8. This government should not provide commercial or financial support to apartheid. Export-Import Bank exposure in South Africa has quadrupled between 1970 and 1974 increasing from \$20.3 million in December 30, 1970 to \$110.8 million by September 30, 1974. In July, the Department of Agriculture announced that the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) offered a new \$1 million line of credit to finance exports of U.S. beef and dairy breeding cattle to ranches in South Africa. Such encouragement of trade with South Africa should end.

9. Nuclear Cooperation with South Africa should cease. Last year the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorized the shipment of 83.4 pounds of highly enriched uranium to South Africa. Moreover, the Export-Import Bank is now considering guaranteeing a several million dollar loan to General Electric to build a nuclear reactor in South Africa. The U.S. should not cooperate in the improvement of South Africa's nuclear capability. Already the Pretoria regime enjoys military superiority on the African continent.

10. The U.S. should show as much concern about South Africa's denial of visas to Black members of Congress and other Black Americans as it does about Arab countries' denial of visas to Jewish Congressman and other Jewish Americans. This government should protest the denial of South African visas to Americans holding official and diplomatic passports. South African requests for visas to the United States should be handled on the basis of complete reciprocity.

#### Namibia

The U.S. position on Namibia which used to be an enlightened one has taken two steps backward.

11. The June veto of a Security Council resolution, calling for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, after noting South Africa's failure to comply with Security Council Resolution 366 of December 1974 (supported by the US) cannot be too strongly condemned. This veto placed the U.S. in the position of having to devise some positive alternatives now for ending the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa. These alternatives may include:

-- initiating Security Council resolution seeking an Article 39 determination, without moving to Article 41, that South Africa's continued presence in Namibia is an act of aggression, and calling upon South Africa, pursuant to Article 40, to comply with such provisional measures as the Council deems necessary or desirable;

-- reviewing the issue of whether the administrative discretion to deny U.S. tax credits to American businesses for taxes paid to the South African occupiers for their holdings in Namibia exists.

12. The administration should undertake a serious inquiry into the practices of U.S. firms in Namibia pursuant to US obligations under Security Council Resolution 310. Specifically, it should:

--require the Securities and Exchange Commission to assure that the prospectuses of all companies with holdings in Namibia reveal fully the facts on the legal situation here and U.S. policy toward Namibia.

--extend its refusal to assist in protecting U.S. business investment in Namibia "against claims of a future lawful government in Namibia" to all American companies regardless of the date of the investment.

13. The U.S. should prohibit the importation of "Cape" Seal-skins harvested by or conducted under the auspices of the government of South Africa pursuant to the request by the Fouke Company of Greenville, South Carolina under consideration by the Department of Commerce.

This is a matter of concern since the term "Cape fur seals" includes seal skins from Namibia and the U.S. Government activities and relations with South Africa would be involved.

Any dealings with South Africa on Namibia including dealings in respect to seal skins: (1) are in violation of U.S. legal obligations, (2) are in furtherance of South Africa's illegal administration of Namibia and (3) help to encourage and perpetuate minority rule in southern Africa.

14. As part of a strategy to encourage a peaceful transfer of power the U.S. should give full support to United Nations supervised territory-wide elections on a one-person, one-vote basis.

Finally, making a substantial contribution to the Institute of Namibia so that Namibians can benefit from training will help insure a smooth transition of administrative functions when majority rule occurs.

## Southern Rhodesia

The escalation of the external and internal pressures on the Smith regime to reach an accord with African nationalist groups is likely to hasten the advent of majority rule in Southern Rhodesia.

15. A strong unified government executive position on the repeal of the Byrd amendment which permits the importation of chrome and other strategic materials from Southern Rhodesia in violation of mandatory Security Council sanctions, is essential and long overdue. A firm statement to this effect, reinforced by appropriate discussions with the Congressional leadership made within the next few days should give a clear signal to the Smith regime as it prepares for constitutional talks in late August that it can no longer expect U.S. trade assistance.

16. The administration also should review the status of the Rhodesian Information Office (RIO) and its staff.

There is some evidence that permitting the RIO to continue some of the activities being carried out by its personnel, such as promoting trade with Southern Rhodesia, violates U.S. obligations under the applicable Security Council resolution.

## Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau

17. The U.S. should provide a foreign assistance program for Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola that is not tied to assistance to Portugal.

Portugal's abysmal education policy in these three territories has resulted in a scarcity of well-trained personnel. We should seize the opportunity to assist the new governments by creating a large scale education and training program with some provision for

third country study.

The armed conflict in Angola is to be deplored. The situation involving three liberation movements, the FNLA, the MPLA and UNITA and their supporters is extremely complex. The ideological stance of the groups is neither profound nor permanent and, therefore, should not serve as a basis upon which to choose sides.

18. Our position should be to support those forces working for unity of the three groups and peaceful settlement. The ethnic and territorial base of support of each of the three groups suggests that neither one can rule an independent Angola without the support of the others.

The U.S. should not endorse or support any effort through official or private channels, i.e. Gulf Oil Corporation, to impair the territorial integrity of Angola. Any secessionist attempt by FLEC or other forces in Cabinda should be unalterably opposed. America's long run interest in having access to Angola's oil resources dictates that our hands remain clean during this period of armed conflict.

19. Specifically, we should assist the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and Portugal to reach an accommodation between the three rival factions and be prepared to strengthen the OAU's capability if necessary to bring about such an agreement.

In addition, the U.S. should continue to make assistance available to Angolan as well as Portugese refugees affected by the civil strife,

## Black Input into the Foreign Policy Process

20. The Administration should expand the number of Blacks serving at the highest levels in the Department of State, other Departments and executive agencies where foreign policy decisions are made.

We note with concern that as of November 30, 1974, only 92 or 2.7 per cent of the Department's foreign service officers were Black. Moreover most of these are concentrated in the lower grades. Too frequently Black officers are shunted into the administrative cones rather than the substantive cones in the Department.

We understand that the Department has initiated a special program to hire 24 minority junior officers and 20 minority and women mid-level officers. Since these positions will be open to all minorities and in the case of the mid-level program also to women, the real increase of Blacks is likely to be minimal. Furthermore, knowledge of attitudes and promotion trends within the agency would indicate that the mid-level officers who will come in through lateral entry may not advance as quickly as other officers.

We commend the Department upon the appointment of the first Black Assistant Secretary, John E. Reinhart, who has responsibility for public affairs, but express dismay that there are only five Black ambassadors, and four deputy chiefs of mission, none of whom serve in Europe, Asia or the Middle East.

21. The Administration should not confine Black State Department representation to certain regions, but should assign Blacks anywhere in the world in recognition of their diverse interests and talents.

While we are not sufficiently well informed to make accurate judgements about the reasons for the decisions, we are concerned

## Conclusion

We have recommended a number of actions the United States can take to improve its policy toward Southern Africa. They are proposals with which to open the debate.

One initial step that should be taken involves increasing the Administration's sensitivity to the concerns of the majority rule states of Africa. Neither the President nor the Secretary of State has made any comprehensive statement about U.S. policy toward Africa. Frequently the State Department pronounces one policy while other departments and agencies such as Commerce, Defense, Interior, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration articulate another. Perhaps such inconsistencies are a result of a lack of clarity about policy rather than purposeful obfuscation. However, a clear, positive executive policy should be designed that is known to and upheld by all executive departments.

This Administration has an opportunity to improve its relations with an area whose economic and strategic importance in the international community is increasing. Therefore, it is vital that the President and the Secretary of State come to grips with the reality of U.S. interests as they relate to economic links with African states and the impending crisis in Southern Africa.