

and I can safely say that the overwhelming reaction at each meeting was one of concern and fear.

I voted in favor of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act because I feel strongly that the continued storage of nuclear waste materials in temporary facilities at nuclear powerplants across the Nation is the worst possible answer to the waste disposal problem. Before supporting this act, however, I insisted that the Governor of a chosen State have veto power over the final site selection. And as you know, this veto can only be overridden by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

At the present time, we are at a stage where the Department of Energy has identified approximately 200 rock bodies for further consideration and final guidelines for the screening of these sites has just been announced. This screening process, as outlined by the 1982 act, considers various environmental, geological, and socioeconomic parameters to determine the suitability of an area as a potential waste site. Reviewing these guidelines has revealed not only deficiencies in the screening process but also basic inadequacies in the original law.

It is clear that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act did not place enough emphasis on the importance of considering the adequacy of regional and local transportation systems, and the potential transboundary impacts of a waste site in the population centers and hydrogeological resources of our foreign neighbors. In interpreting the act's requirements regarding population centers, DOE's screening guidelines creates a bias against the unique rural population centers that are prevalent in Vermont and throughout New England.

Mr. Speaker, I think you would agree that the immense task of finding a safe, suitable location for a high-level nuclear waste facility is equalled only by devising a safe and effective means of transporting this waste to the repository. With this in mind, I feel it is imperative that the condition of a region's transportation routes be fully assessed and considered a potential disqualifying factor if found to be inadequate. This survey must include an assessment of the status of these routes under varying climatic conditions.

In assigning various factors that would disqualify a location as a waste site, the 1982 act did not include any reference to the potential impacts of a site on the physical and biological environment of our foreign neighbors. This is an unfortunate oversight. As we all know, environmental and geological features know no political boundaries. This point was voiced by numerous Canadian citizens and officials attending the informational meetings held in Vermont.

The act did identify proximity to highly populated areas as a factor that would disqualify an area for further consideration as a potential waste site. The guidelines established by the Department of Energy regarding population, unfortunately, are not sensitive to the distribution of population in a rural area like Vermont. The Department has decided that municipalities of 2,500 or more that meet the Bureau of Census definition of "incorporated place" will be con-

sidered a highly populated area. This census classification excludes the incorporated towns of Vermont.

The result of DOE's decision to use this classification is to ignore 34 Vermont municipalities with populations of 2,500 or more. Unless the problem with the definition of a highly populated area is corrected, these Vermont municipalities will be treated on a different basis than comparable municipalities in other States in the crystalline rock study area. The safety of those living in these uncounted populated areas requires that the guidelines be adjusted to include their consideration.

It would be inappropriate to locate a waste site in Vermont due to the fractured, water-saturated nature of our granite formations, the proximity of these rock regions to our rural community centers, and our relative location, geologically and along surface water routes, to major United States and Canadian population centers. I am confident that the screening process established by the DOE will bear out these obvious flaws and limitations in a Vermont site.

However to ensure that all sites in the crystalline rock study area are fully assessed on their limitations and merits, the legislation I am introducing today will refine the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to include a better assessment of the adequacy of a region's transportation routes, a more equitable consideration of rural population centers and an assessment of the impacts of a repository on Canadian population centers and hydrogeologic resources. This is indeed a very hazardous and dangerous undertaking and we must proceed with the utmost caution.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to give this initiative their full consideration and support.

PUBLIC SENTIMENT IN WHITE SOUTH AFRICA

HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 11, 1985

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise to bring to my colleagues' attention a little known element in the antiapartheid equation. This element is the widespread desire among South Africa's whites for sweeping change in that country's racial policies.

President Botha has indicated that he has been forced into a balancing act between those who want an immediate end to apartheid, and those who would fight to the bitter end. If one is to accept Botha's argument, one would believe that he has been exceedingly flexible in turning South Africa away from racial separation. The problem is, of course, that Botha's supposed middle course is nothing more than maintenance of the status quo.

Most white South Africans now favor the dismantling of racial separation as the fundamental tenet of apartheid. They have not taken the next step of favoring universal franchise, but they are certainly not in step with Botha's hardline policies. Our colleague STEPHEN SOLARZ has written an ex-

cellent article on this subject. I would like to submit it for inclusion in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and urge my colleagues to give it close scrutiny.

[From the New York Times, Oct. 8, 1985]

TACKLING APARTHEID FROM THE INSIDE

(By Stephen J. Solarz)

WASHINGTON.—Defenders of the status quo in South Africa have resorted to the convenient fiction that the unyielding resistance of the white electorate prevents Pretoria from abolishing apartheid. In fact, the Government actually trails white opinion rather than being constrained by it. Public opinion polls indicate that roughly 70 percent of English-speaking whites and 40 percent of Afrikaners—or a slight majority of the white population—would support a unified South Africa with a universal franchise and a multiracial parliament. They would also back the elimination of such essential elements of apartheid as pass laws and influx controls, which separate blacks from their families.

This significant shift in white opinion can be traced in part to the movement of many Afrikaners from the country to the city. This has created a new class of businessmen and technocrats, who are more sophisticated and more skeptical of the illusions and sophistries of apartheid. The secret organization of Afrikaners known as the Broederhood, which has long been a bulwark of apartheid, now favors genuine power-sharing with blacks. And leading Afrikaner businessmen have joined their English-speaking counterparts in calling for fundamental political, social and economic changes.

To be sure, most South African whites would reject a unitary state based on the principle of one-man, one-vote, in which 51 percent of the voters could work their untrammelled will. But they might well accept a system of checks and balances based on a combination of majority rule and minority rights, with Federal arrangements providing for a devolution of power to regional and local authorities. While such a formula clearly falls short of maximum black aspirations, it would probably be an acceptable starting point for a long overdue dialogue between the races.

A move by the Government to enter into negotiations for power-sharing with blacks would undoubtedly trigger a backlash from hardline Afrikaners, leading to a fundamental political realignment among whites. The resulting fragmentation of the National Party's Afrikaner base might well deprive it of an absolute majority in Parliament. But it could still remain in power by forming a governing coalition—committed to ending apartheid—with the main opposition party, the Progressive Federal Party.

Unfortunately, such an act of surpassing statesmanship seems beyond the ability—or even the imagination—of President P.W. Botha. The Government is unwilling to further divide the Afrikaner community and risk relying on English-speaking whites for its parliamentary majority. Most importantly, the Government fears that sharing power with blacks would be the first step on a slippery slope toward the political chaos and economic disintegration that have overcome other African countries.

But whites in South Africa have a highly selective vision of the rest of Africa. They focus on Uganda under Idi Amin but forget about the Ivory Coast under Félix Houphouët-Boigny. They recall civil war in Nigeria but not social stability in Kenya. They remember internecine tribal conflicts in Burundi but overlook political pluralism in Botswana.

In fact, the chances that genuine power-sharing will be compatible with prosperity and stability are probably greater in South Africa than anywhere else on the continent. South Africa benefits from extraordinarily rich natural resources and an advanced industrial infrastructure. Furthermore, compared to most other African nations, South Africa has a substantially larger number of educated and urbanized blacks—and thus much less chance of being plagued by the kinds of tribal conflicts that have created problems elsewhere in Africa.

Yet the Government clearly has no intention of sharing significant political power with blacks, let alone negotiating with recognized black leaders. Its list of appropriate negotiators is comprised primarily of co-opted blacks, such as homeland leaders, who are acceptable to whites but anathema to blacks. Meanwhile, it keeps Nelson Mandela in jail, excoriates white business leaders for talking to the head of the African National Congress, Oliver Tambo, charges the Rev. Allen Bosesak with treason and ignores Bishop Desmond Tutu.

Pretoria has recently tried to create the impression that it is prepared to fundamentally alter the political system. Yet it has declared it would permit the independence of additional homelands, even though the reintegration of the existing ones into South Africa is an essential condition for a peaceful settlement. And it has insisted that any future black political participation must reflect tribal affiliations—something that is utterly unacceptable to moderate as well as radical blacks.

What about the reforms that Pretoria has initiated, such as the repeal of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Act? Whites see them as cosmetic, but blacks feel they are merely cosmetic. For blacks, the issue is no longer the segregation of the races but the distribution of political power. Arrangements designed to create the illusion of black participation while preserving the reality of white domination are a formula not for peaceful reconciliation but for prolonged resistance.

Only South Africans can rescue their country from the looming abyss of civil war. Just as President Reagan's policy of constructive engagement could not bring Pretoria to its senses, American economic sanctions alone will not bring it to its knees. It will take a combination of increasing internal and international pressure to convince the South African Government that the price of maintaining apartheid exceeds the cost of abandoning it.

Here, the United States is poised to play a useful role, as anti-apartheid actions spread from Capitol Hill to the White House, and from college campuses to the board rooms of some of our largest banks. We can only hope that Pretoria will heed the calls from within and outside the country to abolish apartheid and share real political power with blacks. Such an initiative would undoubtedly unleash bitter opposition from many of the Government's traditional supporters. But it would also generate widespread support abroad and, most importantly, surprising sympathy from much of the white community at home.

DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

HON. GEORGE MILLER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Friday, October 11, 1985

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, during the last election, President Reagan said that the choice for America in the Philippines was between the Government and the Communists. It would certainly have been interesting to have the President explain his statement to the widow and followers of assassinated opposition leader Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., who was far from being a Communist.

While clearly the statement was not true at the time the President made it, it may very well become true in the not-too-distant future. The failure of the Reagan administration to send strong clear signals to the Marcos government that its current policies are unacceptable will lead to a strengthening of New Peoples Army. This failure will also undermine the ability of non-Communist opposition forces to offer leadership for the post-Marcos era which hopefully will be the dawning of the democratization of the Philippines.

Recent articles in the New Republic point out the all too familiar patterns occurring in the Philippines that could undermine the interests of the United States. While the administration fails to take action, the position of moderates is threatened. As American taxpayer aid continues to flow to the Philippines, the privileged class sends an almost equal amount of money out of the country.

It will be a shame if America should stand in the way of those opposition factions which are seeking to bring democracy and economic justice to the people of the Philippines.

The article by Pete Carey, Katherine Ellison, and Lewis M. Simons, which elaborates on these observations, follows:

MARCOS'S NEST EGG

As the Philippines sink deeper into poverty, foreign debt, and political unrest, many of their most prominent citizens are systematically draining vast amounts of wealth from their nation and hiding it overseas. These political and business leaders, who largely determine the Philippines' economic destiny, have poured their personal fortunes into investments in the United States, including condominiums, luxury homes, office buildings, businesses, and banks in California and New York.

Overseas investments have emerged as a potent political issue in the Philippines. President Ferdinand Marcos and his so-called "cronies" have used their leadership position to accumulate large fortunes in the 20 years Marcos has been in power. Some opposition leaders abroad have made it their bitter vocation to track the holdings of the Marcos circle. Over articles last June in the San Jose, California, *Mercury News* about the extensive U.S. investments of Marcos and his associates were reprinted in major opposition newspapers and discussed in radio broadcasts and sermons. More than 50 members of parliament signed a resolution calling for impeachment hearings. Marcos countered the resolution with a threat to dissolve Parliament and hold presidential elections in November. Marcos has

now apparently dropped the idea of early elections, but the political fallout continues.

At the center of the controversy are Marcos and his wife, Imelda. Like many Filipinos who have invested overseas, they use holdings corporations or business associates to handle their transactions. The complex system makes it difficult to identify the real owners and to identify the relationships between business involved in the investments. But Pablo Figueroa, a former business partner of Mrs. Marcos, charged in a lawsuit filed in March 1984 that Mrs. Marcos "does business in New York State systematically and continuously" and that her activities included "extensive real estate purchasing, improving, developing and managing." Figueroa also said that Mrs. Marcos used agents and nominees "to keep hidden her personal... involvement" in the transactions.

Figueroa said that in 1981 Mrs. Marcos and several partners, using a Curaçao corporation called Ancor Holdings N.V., bought an estate on several acres of property in suburban Long Island known as Lindemere, planning to expand it into a \$19 million resort. Mrs. Marcos abandoned those plans and converted Lindemere into a private estate. In the process, Figueroa said that she failed to pay him one million dollars she had promised as his share in the deal.

Figueroa has since agreed to drop his lawsuit, according to his attorney. (Mrs. Marcos's attorney refused to comment on the suit.) But Figueroa's suit was identical to its allegations to one filed in 1984 by a partner of Figueroa, August M. Camacho. That suit, which also named Mrs. Marcos as defendant, ended with a substantial settlement for Camacho.

There is also evidence to support allegations that the Marcoses own other properties in the United States. A home in Princeton, New Jersey, is owned by an offshore corporation that is represented by the same law firm that represents Ancor Holdings. Police officials in Princeton say the home is used by Marcos family members.

The Marcoses are also linked to three condominiums in a Fifth Avenue apartment building in Manhattan. According to real estate records, the adjoining condominiums are owned by a Hong Kong corporation whose agent is a woman named Vilma Bautista. Bautista is also Mrs. Marcos's personal secretary in New York and a staff member for the Philippines U.N. delegation. She denies knowing about the condominiums. "There are so many names, there are so many numbers," she told us. "This could be another Vilma Bautista."

Other prominent Filipino government officials also often employed surrogates or offshore corporations for their overseas investments. Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and his wife, for example, purchased a \$1.8 million mansion in San Francisco through a company called Renatsac Inc., which is Enrile's wife's maiden name spelled backward. Enrile claims the mansion "was bought by a company and has been sold. We—my wife—was acting for someone. I won't tell you who it was. It's since been sold." Geronimo Velasco, Marcos's energy minister, occasionally resides at a \$925,000 estate in a suburb of San Francisco, whose registered owner is a Hong Kong company called Decision Research Management Ltd.

Businessmen intimate with Marcos rely on the same methods. Antonio Florendo is a banana baron of the Philippines. His business has thrived since Marcos came to power in 1972. Florendo is also a director of Ancor Holdings N.V. Florendo's own properties in the United States include three