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COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS  
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

November 10, 1986

The Honorable  
George Crockett  
Member of Congress  
U.S. House of Representatives  
1531 Longworth HOB  
Washington, 20515

Dear Congressman Crockett,

The enclosed paper, which resulted from my having been a member of the Jackson Delegation to southern Africa in August of this year, is an analysis of the regional security situation in southern Africa. As a long-time student of the region, my impressions were confirmed that the South African destabilization program has been so effective that, besides its political effect, it is accomplishing its economic objective of keeping the states of the region dependent upon its transport infrastructure and trade in a variety of commodities. Thus, the linkage of the regional states to South Africa in this manner constitutes a veritable regional system of Apartheid which has given South Africa a more or less effective "buffer" to internationally sponsored sanctions. Bolstering the economies of these states, therefore, has become a logical strategy for the next stage of the fight against apartheid.

I have been concerned, however, that in some of the legislative initiatives I have heard about - some of which are sponsored by various members of the Congressional Black Caucus - do not contain funds for military assistance to regional states. My analysis and those of others, suggests that since South Africa and its surrogates in the various countries are effectively destroying parts of their economic infrastructures, economic development of the region at this time must proceed within the framework of political security considerations if it is to be successful. There is the situation that the fragile economies of the region are not only ravaged by the enormity of the external debt, but by the internal need to fund their defense against civil war and military intervention by South Africa. This means that economic assistance alone - although desired by such agencies as SADCC - will not meet the need for the long-term viability of development projects. SADCC officials not only have admitted this, but have begun to make security measures a part of their project planning criteria, and SADCC states such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique have mounted joint military operations to protect their economic development projects.

In talks with State Department officials, I am aware of the initiative they have set for \$500 million of new regional economic

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
assistance programming. In my opinion, even if the White House supports this, a substantial fight will have to be mounted in the Congress to produce this amount, given the probable opposition. As you know, the problem is that the so-called "Reagan Doctrine", which is supported by some Members, the basis for funneling covert military assistance to UNITA (and probably RENAMO), is a factor in the destabilization of the region and therefore, of considerable assistance in the maintenance of South African regional apartheid. Obviously, then, the application of the Reagan Doctrine to southern Africa must be attacked, and the question of U. S. military assistance to selected states must be raised. And although I am aware of the odds of being successful, the discussion must be started at some point.

If military assistance is either given to states such as Zambia or Zimbabwe, or greatly increased in the case of Botswana, it would send an important signal to South Africa of American intolerance of its military activities in the regions. To date, there have been only the mildest rebukes from the White House and the State Department to South African raids and economic strangulation - which have come publicly to light. If military assistance were given, the current policy (pp. 46-47) of not providing it to the FLS would obviously be repealed. But even if the aid itself cannot be secured in this session, repeal of the principle would begin to establish a precedent for a more positive role for American security activities in the region that is in line with the objectives of African states.

Finally, I have not made a "hard and fast" analysis of the extent of military assistance to be proposed. But I have suggested three options (pp. 44-49) for approaching the determination of funding. I also use the example of Sudan where, because it was deemed important to U.S. interests both economic and military assistance has been provided. I would hope that there might be some way found to obtain such assistance or at the very least launch this debate. Otherwise, American economic assistance becomes a convenient cover for the pursuit of an essential policy of continued collaboration with South Africa in the region. Moreover, the lack of any balance between economic and military assistance belies the fact that either will be successful.

Thank you very much for your own consideration of this issue in your own deliberations.

Sincerely,



Ronald Walters, Ph.D.  
Professor